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Feminist Pragmatism in the Work of
Justice Bertha Wilson
Colleen Sheppard*

I. INTRODUCTION
Inspired by a commitment to promoting equality and to deciding
individual cases, Justice Bertha Wilson’s ideas resonate with feminist
pragmatism. While pragmatist thought has long-standing historical roots
in American philosophical traditions, it is only recently that the feminist
dimensions of pragmatism have been acknowledged and explored.1 Justice
Wilson’s pragmatism was reflected in her approach to legal interpretation
— an approach based upon the centrality of social context and experiential
knowledge rather than abstract legal formalism. She endeavoured to
ensure that her judicial decisions regarding immediate legal disputes
contributed to advancing social justice, despite her understanding that
there were often no ideal solutions and recognition of significant
constraints linked to broader patterns of systemic and intergenerational
inequity. Yet pragmatism alone does not fully explain Justice Wilson’s
judicial philosophy. Her sensitivity to women’s rights and her willingness
to listen to the voices of those historically excluded from defining the law
are consistent with important aspects of feminist legal theory.2
*
Research Director, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, Faculty of Law,
McGill University. I wish to thank Emilia Ordolis, Monika Rahman and Julian Awwad of the
McGill Faculty of Law for their insightful research assistance on this chapter.
1
See Margaret Jane Radin, “The Pragmatist and the Feminist” (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1699 [hereinafter “‘The Pragmatist and the Feminist’”]. See also Charlene Haddock Seigfried,
Reweaving the Social Fabric — Pragmatism and Feminism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996) [hereinafter “Reweaving the Social Fabric”]; Catharine Pierce Wells, “Why Pragmatism
Works for Me” (2000) 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 347; Mari Matsuda, “Pragmatism Modified and the False
Consciousness Problem” (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1763 [hereinafter “‘Pragmatism Modified’”];
Richard Rorty, “Feminism and Pragmatism” (1991) 30 Mich. Q. Rev. 231 [hereinafter “Feminism
and Pragmatism”]; and Jane Duran, “The Intersection of Pragmatism and Feminism” (1993) 8:2
Hypatia 159. For an example of early scholarship reflective of feminist pragmatism, see Jane
Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (Chicago: University of Illinois, reprinted in 2002).
2
According to biographer Ellen Anderson in Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as
Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”], Justice
Wilson did not identify herself as a feminist. Her judgments and speeches, however, reveal a
consistent and deep concern with advancing women’s rights, a concern at the heart of the feminist
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Justice Wilson’s pragmatism was refracted through a lens of
feminism. It was not simply a matter of making decisions that were
practical within the parameters of current institutional and social
conditions. It was a matter of making decisions that respected and
advanced the equality of women and other socially disadvantaged groups
while operating within the constraints of the rule of law and respecting
the institutional limits on the role of judges. Understanding Justice
Wilson’s contributions through the lens of feminist pragmatism helps to
deepen our understanding of some of the most innovative aspects of her
legal reasoning. In this article, three dimensions of pragmatist thought
are examined which are particularly significant for feminist theory and
which are evident in the work of Justice Wilson. These include the
commitment to making choices that have normative consequences while
acknowledging the practical obstacles of an imperfect world,
endorsement of an interpretative approach rooted in the contextual
realities of everyday life, and a belief in the provisional and dynamic
nature of truth.

II. THE DOUBLE BIND — MAKING CHOICES IN
AN IMPERFECT WORLD
A useful starting point for exploring the theoretical intersections
between pragmatism and feminism in relation to law is Margaret Radin’s
influential article, “The Pragmatist and the Feminist”.3 Professor Radin’s
interest in feminism and pragmatism emerged during her study of legal
issues relating to surrogacy, prostitution and marital contracting. In these
domains, Radin observes that the commodification of women’s reproductive and sexual capacities risks accentuating exploitation and
oppression. At the same time, she acknowledges that legal prohibitions
on commodification threaten to undermine women’s autonomy and in
some cases their economic survival. Radin recognizes, therefore, that
either dichotomous policy choice — for example, allowing contracts that
commodify women’s bodies or prohibiting such contracts — may be
harmful “under current social conditions”.4 Yet, often either-or choices
are the only ones available in the short term. She labels this dilemma the
project. See discussion in Clare McGlynn, “Book Review of Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha
Wilson: Law as Large as Life” (2003) 11 Feminist Studies 307.
3
“The Pragmatist and the Feminist”, supra, note 1.
4
Id., at 1770.
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“double bind”.5 Feminist pragmatists, therefore, recognize that “an
outcome along ideal dimensions may leave individuals without a
remedy”.6
Understanding the double bind problem arises from consciousness of
a duality between an ideal feminist analysis of gender equality and the
actual effects of legal and policy choices in the context of present-day
realities and constraints for women living in a non-ideal world. Imposing
legal and policy choices premised on de-contextualized ideals of gender
equality may impose significant harms on women given the immediate
options and choices they have under existing social, economic and
political conditions. Radin suggests that we “must look carefully at the
non-ideal circumstances in each case and decide which horn of the
dilemma is better (or less bad), and we must keep re-deciding as time
goes on”.7 Rather than seeking a solution that resolves the double bind
(an impossible task in the short term), Radin advocates choosing “the
alternative that will hinder empowerment the least and further it the
most”.8 Thus feminist pragmatism provides a theoretical framework for
understanding the logic of decision-making in contexts of constrained
and non-ideal choices.
Feminist judges are routinely confronted with the dilemma of the
double bind. Because judging occurs in a non-ideal world, they
recognize that ideal and principled outcomes may not be possible in the
face of existing social and economic conditions. However, they still
believe in the broader ideals, resulting in the experience of the double
bind. In an important speech about women judges, “Will Women Judges
Really Make a Difference?”, Justice Wilson began by articulating her
concerns about the expectations that women in Canada had regarding her
appointment as the first woman on the Supreme Court. Though many
heralded what they called “a new era for women”, Justice Wilson asks:
“So why was I not rejoicing? Why did I not share the tremendous
confidence of these women?”9 She states:

5

Id.
Nancy Levit & Robert R.M. Verchick, Feminist Legal Theory: A Primer (New York:
New York University Press, 2006), at 34.
7
“The Pragmatist and the Feminist”, supra, note 1, at 1700.
8
Id., at 1704.
9
Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (The Fourth Annual
Barbara Betcherman Memorial Lecture, delivered at Osgoode Hall Law School, February 8, 1990),
(1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507 [hereinafter “Women Judges”].
6
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… I knew from hard experience that the law does not work that way.
Change in law comes slowly and incrementally; that is its nature. It
responds to changes in society; it seldom initiates them. And while I
was prepared — and, indeed, as a woman judge, anxious — to respond
to these changes, I wondered to what extent I would be constrained in
my attempts to do so by the nature of judicial office itself.10

Justice Wilson was sensitive to the limits of adjudication as a
pathway to social change and, as explored further below, articulated
various versions of the double bind problem in her judgments.
Nonetheless, she was not afraid to challenge traditional frameworks and
expand conventional legal categories as a means of moving forward,
albeit haltingly and in complex ways, towards a more inclusive and
egalitarian vision of legal rights and obligations.
Justice Wilson’s pragmatic acceptance of the non-ideal conditions in
which law operates is revealed in her approach to judging in a number of
different contexts. In one of her most significant decisions while at the
Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Lavallee,11 Justice Wilson acknowledged
the importance of understanding the defence of self-defence in light of
the lived realities of conjugal violence. Her judgment gave voice to
societal condemnation of domestic violence:
The gravity, indeed, the tragedy of domestic violence can hardly be
overstated. Greater media attention to this phenomenon in recent years
has revealed both its prevalence and its horrific impact on women from
all walks of life. Far from protecting women from it the law
historically sanctioned the abuse of women within marriage as an
aspect of the husband’s ownership of his wife and his “right” to
chastise her.12

She then endeavoured to elaborate the law of self-defence, insisting
that the jury consider emerging expert knowledge about the realities of
domestic abuse in assessing whether the accused had both a reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and a genuine belief that
escape was impossible. While Justice Wilson recognized that it is clearly
preferable for abused women to leave violent relationships instead of
resorting to spousal homicide, she nevertheless insisted that the law be
attentive to the constrained choices and desperation abused women live.
In a speech about domestic violence delivered just after her retirement
10
11
12

Id., at 13.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavallee”].
Id., at 872.
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from the Supreme Court in 1991, and shortly after the Lavallee decision,
Justice Wilson maintained that violence against women in the family
will continue to occur until women “are recognized as equal, respected,
and involved partners by the society at large and the institutions which
comprise it”.13 For Justice Wilson, the ideal solution to domestic abuse
was integrally connected to the larger struggle for gender equality. In the
absence of such ideal conditions, however, her judicial decisions
reflected a willingness to endeavour to decide cases based on the
practical realities of societal inequality.
Beyond the context of domestic violence, Justice Wilson’s
judgments in a wide range of areas repeatedly attest to the necessity of
making difficult either-or decisions when neither option is ideal. For
example, in a trilogy of cases involving the rights of prostitutes, Justice
Wilson recognized that there were no ideal solutions proffered by law. In
her dissenting reasons, striking down Criminal Code14 prohibitions on
sexual solicitation, she chose to uphold the rights of prostitutes to
freedom of expression:
While it is an undeniable fact that many people find the idea of
exchanging sex for money offensive and immoral, it is also a fact that
many types of conduct which are subject to widespread disapproval
and allegations of immorality have not been criminalized. Indeed, one
can think of a number of reasons why selling sex has not been made a
criminal offence … more often than not the real “victim” of
prostitution is the prostitute himself or herself. Sending prostitutes to
prison for their conduct may therefore be viewed by legislators as an
unsuitable response to the phenomenon.15

Justice Wilson’s sensitivity to the need to move forward in an
imperfect world, in domains which were of critical importance in
women’s lives, informed the methodological dimensions of her approach
to judging.
With respect to abortion rights, her path-breaking concurring
judgment in Morgentaler affirmed a woman’s right to decide whether or
not to terminate an unwanted pregnancy as a dimension of her

13

Bertha Wilson, “Family Violence” (An Address to the National Convention of B’nai
Brith Women of Canada, May 26, 1991), (1992) 5 Can J. of Women & L. 137, at 141 [hereinafter
“Family Violence”].
14
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
15
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c ) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1216 (S.C.C.).
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entitlement to both liberty and security of the person.16 In so doing, she
acknowledges that a woman’s decision about abortion is a difficult one
“that will have profound psychological, economic and social
consequences for the pregnant woman”.17 She continues:
... The circumstances giving rise to it can be complex and varied and
there may be, and usually are, powerful considerations militating in
opposite directions. It is a decision that deeply reflects the way the
woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and to
society at large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound social
and ethical one as well. Her response to it will be the response of the
whole person.18

Recognition of the situational complexities of the dilemma of
abortion resonates with pragmatism. Justice Wilson then proceeds to
affirm women’s constitutional right to make that complex decision —
recognizing that its ethical and legal dimensions cannot be abstracted
from the contextual realities of women’s lives. While affirming women’s
constitutional rights and freedoms, Justice Wilson also recognizes the
existence of countervailing and legitimate interests in the protection of
the foetus “at the later stages of [a woman’s] pregnancy when the state’s
compelling interest in the protection of the foetus would justify it in
prescribing conditions”.19 Thus, she again demonstrates a resistance to
absolutist outcomes, based on abstract principles. Instead, she recognizes
that women’s rights may yield to countervailing concerns depending on
the conditions and circumstances.
In the domain of family law, she also demonstrated a willingness to
make decisions in contexts where neither choice was ideal. In a widely
criticized decision, Racine v. Woods,20 she accorded custody via a de
facto adoption process to the foster parents of a young Aboriginal girl. In
rejecting the Aboriginal biological mother’s claim for custody, Justice
Wilson states that the decision was difficult given the dual concerns with
Aboriginal cultural heritage and parent-child bonding as dimensions of
the best interest of the child. Still, she accepted the view that a decision
should be made rather than leaving the child’s family status in limbo.
16
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Morgentaler”].
17
Id., at 171.
18
Id.
19
Id., at 183.
20
[1983] S.C.J. No. 71, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.).
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She thus notes the need to “bite the bullet”21 and decide. In so doing, she
upholds the de facto adoption claim of the foster parents on the grounds
that the child had bonded with her foster parents during the biological
mother’s three-year absence.
... In my view, when the test to be met is the best interests of the child,
the significance of cultural background and heritage as opposed to
bonding abates over time. The closer the bond that develops with the
prospective adoptive parents the less important the racial element
becomes.22

Justice Wilson demonstrates a willingness to make a choice despite
conflicting concerns and risks of harm regardless of which choice was
made. Nevertheless, she was criticized for the ways in which her
decision reinforced systemic racism against Aboriginal people in the
child welfare system and for her failure to appreciate the significant
efforts made by the biological mother to remake her life.23
Justice Wilson was also criticized for her decision in a trilogy of
cases dealing with spousal support.24 In all three cases, she denied
spousal support to economically needy wives — prompting criticism
from feminist legal scholars about her failure to be adequately attentive
to the economic consequences of marriage on women.25 Justice Wilson’s
reasoning engaged with a number of conflicting policy concerns and
principles. She endorsed the idea of freedom of contract, spousal
compensation for economic dependence causally connected to marriage,
the importance of allowing individuals to terminate once and for all the
bonds of marriage, and state responsibility for economic well-being. In
an effort to take these divergent and sometimes conflicting principles
into account, she crafted her “causal connection” test — which limited
spousal support obligations to cases where the current economic need of
the former spouse was foreseeable and causally connected to the

21

Id., at 187.
Id., at 187-88.
23
Patricia A. Monture, “A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations” (1989) 3
C.J.W.L. 1, at 12-14.
24
See Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] S.C.J. No. 31, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Pelech”]; Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] S.C.J. No. 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 (S.C.C.); Caron v.
Caron, [1987] S.C.J. No. 32, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) .
25
See, e.g., Martha J. Bailey, “Pelech, Caron, and Richardson” (1989) 3 C.J.W.L. 615. See
also Carol J. Rogerson, “The Causal Connection Test in Spousal Support Law” (1989) 8 Can. J. of
Fam. L. 95.
22
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marriage relationship.26 In applying this framework to the specific factual
circumstances of the trilogy of cases before the Court, she concluded
that the economic need of the three wives seeking spousal support was
not causally connected to their previous marriages, and thus denied their
claims.
In a speech about family law a few years after her decisions in the
trilogy, Justice Wilson appears to recognize that perhaps the Court did
not adequately take into account the extended effects of economic
disadvantage linked to marriage.27 Nevertheless, the idea of basing
economic obligations between spouses on some form of compensatory
rationale that uses the logic of the causal connection test has been
endorsed in other contexts, most notably the widely praised constructive
trust cases involving common law couples.28 Moreover, Justice Wilson’s
support for a more robust public responsibility for economic well-being,
and resistance to the logic of the privatization of economic
responsibilities, has been reclaimed as an important and yet often
overlooked aspect of the spousal support trilogy.29

III. KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE: CONTEXTUAL APPROACHES
It is so much easier to come up with a black and white answer if you
are unencumbered by a broader context which might prompt you … to
temper the cold light of reason with the warmer tints of imagination
and sympathy.30

Faced with the recognition that we do not live in an ideal world —
that moral, ethical, legal choices operate in the complex, messy,
compromised contexts of everyday life, Justice Wilson advocated the
need to adopt a contextual approach to legal reasoning. According to
Justice Wilson, a contextual approach “recognizes that a particular right
26

Pelech, supra, note 24, at 851-52. This test appears to have been inspired by the
constructive trust cases which relied on the causal connection concept to determine equitable
distribution of property entitlements between common law spouses and which was widely praised
by feminist legal scholars. See Pettkus v. Becker, [1978] O.J. No. 3398, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 101 (Ont.
C.A.), affd [1980] S.C.J. No. 103, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pettkus”].
27
Bertha Wilson, “Women, the Family, and the Constitutional Protection of Privacy” (1992)
17 Queen’s L.J. 5, at 16-17 [hereinafter “Women, the Family”].
28
See, e.g., Pettkus v. Becker, [1978] O.J. No. 3398, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 101 (Ont. C.A.) per
Wilson J.A., affd [1980] S.C.J. No. 103, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.).
29
See Robert Leckey, “What Is Left of Pelech?” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 103.
30
Jutice Wilson citing Lord Macmillan in “Women Judges”, supra, note 9, at 23.
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or freedom may have a different value depending on the context”.31 In an
important concurring opinion regarding the interpretation of the section
1 balancing provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Justice Wilson notes:
... The contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the
aspect of the right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well
as the relevant aspects of any values in competition with it. It seems to
be more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular
facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just
compromise between the two competing values under s. 1.32

The contextual approach is prevalent throughout Justice Wilson’s
judgments and writings. To cite another example from her speech on
constitutional law, family law and privacy, Justice Wilson writes:
Real lives, contemporary women’s lives should not only be taken
seriously but should be regarded as primary in interpreting
constitutional guarantees which impact directly or indirectly on
women’s equality. Experiences must not be “shoehorned” to fit within
the constitutional guarantees: rather, the constitutional guarantees must
be interpreted in a way that is responsive to women’s reality.33

Justice Wilson championed a contextual methodology, linking it to a
purposive approach that is consistent with the rejection of an originalist
or frozen rights approach and reflective of a vision of the Constitution as
a “living tree”.34 For Justice Wilson, a contextual approach engages
judges in an assessment of the lived realities of individuals, historical
understandings of legal categories and concepts and modern social
conditions.
This insistence on linking law to the myriad complex contexts of
modern social life finds important parallels in pragmatist philosophy. As
31
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R.
1326, at 1355-56 (S.C.C.).
32
Id. The appellant in the case sought a declaration that statutory provisions prohibiting the
publication of personal details in matrimonial proceedings contravene, in part, the right to freedom
of expression. The majority of the Court, including Wilson J., ruled in favour of the appellant. In a
separate judgment, Wilson J. referred to the need to adopt a contextual rather than an abstract
approach; the former recognizing the value differential of rights depending on the specific context
under consideration which, in turn, contributes to addressing the particular aspect(s) of the right in
question and aspects of other rights that may be in competition with it. See Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
33
“Women, the Family”, supra, note 27, at 13.
34
Id., at 8 and 29.
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John Dewey noted, “neglect of context is the greatest single disaster
which philosophic thinking can incur”.35 As a critical contributor to
pragmatist philosophy in the United States, Dewey’s ideas underscore
the need to ground theory in practice and experiential knowledge. As
Shannon Sullivan explains, Dewey used the term “transaction” to denote
the “dynamic, co-constitutive relationship” between individuals and their
environment.36 A recurrent theme in pragmatist philosophy is a concern
with actual concrete contexts rather than abstract, universal principles
and concepts.37 As Sullivan suggests, “… pragmatism’s emphasis on
concrete particulars of ‘real’ life, instead of abstractions … lend it to
feminist discourse”.38
Yet, pragmatist contextualism in and of itself does not provide an
adequate account of Justice Wilson’s judicial philosophy. Justice
Wilson’s pragmatic turn to real life contexts and perspectives was deeply
embedded in a concern with the effects of law on socially disadvantaged
and disempowered groups, including women. Informing legal rights and
obligations with the contextual realities of those who have been
excluded from historical processes of defining legal concepts and
categories was central to Justice Wilson’s contextual methodology. It is
this aspect of Wilson’s interpretive methodology that resonates with
feminist theory, particularly feminist standpoint theory. A central
premise of feminist standpoint theory is the importance of “‘starting off
thought’ from the lives of marginalized peoples” in order to “generate
less partial and distorted accounts, not only of women’s lives, but also of
men’s lives and of the whole social order”.39 Justice Wilson’s approach
also parallels what Mari Matsuda calls a “weighted pragmatic method”
— an approach that actively seeks “to retrieve subordinated voices in
35
John Dewey, “Context and Thought” in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Later Works of John
Dewey, 1925-1953, vol. 6 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 19811990), at 11, cited in Reweaving the Social Fabric, supra, note 1, at 38.
36
Shannon Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism
and Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), at 1 [hereinafter “Living Across and
Through Skins”].
37
Nancy Levit & Robert R.M. Verchick, Feminist Legal Theory: A Primer (New York:
New York University Press, 2006), at 11-12.
38
Living Across and Through Skins, supra, note 36, at 5. Though such an orientation
resonates with the legal realist approach to interpretation, unlike many legal realist scholars,
pragmatists did not seek to find an objective truth through empirical analysis — or objectively
correct legal concepts and meanings.
39
Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: ‘What is Strong Objectivity?’”
in Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993) 49,
at 56.
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order to attain a truer account of social reality and human possibilities”.40
A number of scholars who endorse pragmatic approaches have also
focused on seeking to “grasp the world from the perspective of the
dominated, to hear the outsiders who have been silent and are now trying
to speak … [and] allow … the developing perspectives of the oppressed
to infiltrate the dominant institutional coherence”.41 Indeed, most
poignantly, Robert Cover’s important idea of nomos — the regenerative
interpretive authority of the oppressed — resonates with a pragmatism
that encourages resistance and reinterpretations of dominant hegemonic
understandings of the world from the perspective of the powerless.42
Such a modified or critical contextualism is important to ensuring
that pragmatic approaches do not use the status quo in a world of
systemic and structural inequality to define that which ought to be. In
other words, traditional pragmatism may provide justifications and
legitimation to conventional understandings of the world, rooted in
present-day social and institutional constraints. Catharine MacKinnon
has alluded to the tendency in law to define as “reasonable” that which
currently is practicable and possible within the prevailing status quo.43
Radin explains that pragmatism can reinforce conservative world views
to the extent that an “unenlightened, complacent pragmatist tends to
argue that since ‘truth’ about the world is found in conceptual coherence,
legal ‘truth’ should be discerned by reference to institutional
coherence”.44 This conservative risk of traditional pragmatism reinforces
the importance of developing a feminist pragmatist lens.
Justice Wilson’s approach reflects a deep commitment to
understanding the world from the perspective of those who have been
excluded and socially disadvantaged in society. For example, in a
remarkable passage in Morgentaler, Justice Wilson demonstrates her
40

“Pragmatism Modified” (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1763, at 1768. See also Hilary
Putnam, “A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy” (1989) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1681.
41
“The Pragmatist and the Feminist” (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699, at 1724. She cites the
scholarship of Martha Minow and Frank Michelman in this regard at 1723. See also “Pragmatism
Modified”, id.; “Feminism and Pragmatism” (1991) 30 Mich Q. Rev. 231; and Nancy Fraser, “From
Irony to Prophecy to Politics: A Response to Richard Rorty” (1991) 30:2 Mich. Q. Rev. 259. For a
feminist standpoint theory perspective, see also Sandra Harding, “Starting Thought from Women’s
Lives: Eight Resources for Maximizing Objectivity” (1990) 21:2-3 Journal of Social Philosophy
140.
42
Robert Cover, “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1601.
43
Catharine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State — Towards
Feminist Jurisprudence” in Sandra Harding, ed., Feminism and Methodology (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1987) 135-56, at 141.
44
“The Pragmatist and the Feminist”, supra, note 41, at 1721.
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profound respect for the experiential knowledge of women faced with a
decision about whether to terminate a pregnancy.
… It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively,
to such a dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his
personal experience (although this is, of course, the case) but because
he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the
subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the
dilemma.45

Her comments reflect a deep respect for deferring to the choices made by
those who live the dilemma of abortion, with all of its moral and ethical
complexities.
In a similar vein, Justice Wilson’s decision in Lavallee interprets the
meaning of self-defence in criminal law on the basis of abused women’s
experiential knowledge
… If it strains credulity to imagine what the “ordinary man” would do
in the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not
typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do, however.
The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances
which are, by and large, foreign to a world inhabited by the
hypothetical “reasonable man”.46

The traditional legal standard for reasonableness linked to the mythical
“ordinary man” is displaced in favour of an appreciation of the
specificity of the lives of abused and battered women. Hester Lessard
also highlights Justice Wilson’s focus on social context and
“attentiveness to detail in the stories of the central actors” in assessing
reasonableness.47 In Lavallee, for example, Lessard notes that “the
suggestion that it was reasonable for Lyn Lavallee to defend herself by
shooting Kevin Rust as he left the room is supported by a detailed
account of Lavallee’s actual situation as well as an exploration of the
social phenomenon of male violence towards women”.48
Another striking example of Justice Wilson’s willingness to listen to
the experiential knowledge of women, even when it diverges from
socially accepted norms, is found in a speech she delivered on violence
against women. She laments the inadequacy of the legal system in
45
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responding to problems of domestic violence and then concludes her
speech with the words of an abused woman, who, after calling the police
ended up losing her children, being divorced by her husband and being
economically destitute and on welfare:
These are her anguished words:
Why did I ever call the police? They took my family, my home, my
security, my dignity, and my belief in what is right. I would rather
be beaten every day of my life by my husband than have a bunch of
strangers take my life away without ever asking.
Let us hope that the decade of the nineties will bring an end to the
brutal face of inequality.49

What is remarkable about this excerpt is its honouring of the experiential
knowledge of women, even when that knowledge is diametrically
opposed to common conceptions about gender equality and necessary
legal responses to conjugal violence. It demonstrates Justice Wilson’s
deep commitment to listening to what women say about the concrete
effects of law on their daily lives, taking them seriously in her reflections
on the justice system and amplifying them in her capacity as a public
figure and judge.
Taking the experiential realities of socially disadvantaged and
disempowered groups seriously as a starting point for legal interpretation
resulted in a willingness both to question fundamental conceptual
categories in law and to begin their creative reconceptualization. For
example, in a speech on the concept of privacy in constitutional law, she
asks:
What can we learn when we ask ourselves what is it like to experience
life as a woman? The main thing we learn, I believe, is that for women
the distinction between public and private life is unreal.50

Her response reveals a willingness to challenge fundamental dimensions
of conventional legal thought — the basic distinction between the public
and private spheres. Moreover, Justice Wilson went further than critique,
relying on experiential knowledge in her efforts to reformulate legal
categories and rights — “to adapt doctrine, notwithstanding its historical
roots, to contemporary reality and in particular to ensure that it serves all
49
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the people, women as well as men”.51 Justice Wilson’s defiance of
convention and willingness to articulate new approaches to law
distinguished her from her fellow judges in some key instances — with
the result that a few of her most creative and memorable judgments were
hers alone — sole dissenting decisions or concurring opinions.52

IV. THE PLURALITY OF TRUTH — PROVISIONAL CLAIMS
AND CONTINUING CHANGE
A third theme that demonstrates the resonance between Justice
Wilson’s ideas and pragmatist thought is her open acceptance of the
provisional, dynamic and tentative nature of legal categories and
concepts. As Radin emphasizes, “pragmatism recommends that we take
our present descriptions with humility and openness, and accept their
institutional embodiments as provisional and incompletely entrenched”.53
As John Dewey wrote, “Truth is a collection of truths; and these
constituent truths are in the keeping of the best available methods of
inquiry and testing as to matters-of-fact.”54 In what has been called
neopragmatism, Richard Rorty affirms the importance of “courage and
imagination rather than putatively neutral criteria”.55
In reflecting on the significance of pragmatist theory to feminism,
Rorty heralds feminist scholars who resist “ahistoric realism”56 and do
not endeavour to “develop a non-hegemonic discourse, where truth is no
51
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longer connected to power”. In Rorty’s view, it is impossible to “do
away with social constructs in order to find something that is not a social
construct”. Instead, he endorses feminist theory which is engaged in
imagining new ways of being by appealing to “dimly imagined future
practice”.57 Rorty’s ideas on feminism and pragmatism highlight a
critical source of divergence in feminist thought. While some feminist
scholars seek to heighten or attain objectivity by including the
perspectives and experiential knowledge of women and other socially
disadvantaged groups, other feminist theorists reject the idea of objective
knowledge. For many feminist scholars, all knowledge is socially
constructed and intimately linked to one’s power and position in
society.58 Feminist pragmatism embraces this vision of provisional and
tentative knowledge, that is constantly tested and evolving in a changing
world.
Justice Wilson’s approach embodied the important pragmatist insight
that “truth is inevitably plural, concrete, and provisional”.59 While it is no
doubt true that virtually all legal theorists and lawyers understand that law
is dynamic and continually evolving over time, the traditions of legal
formalism still provide an important counterweight — insisting that law is
separate from politics, that law is objective, and that we must strive for
certainty and longevity in the definition of legal rights and principles.
Justice Wilson defied conventional legal thinking and repeatedly
articulated the need both to question past definitions and concepts and to
innovate by bringing fresh perspectives and approaches to law. Moreover,
she recognized that her innovations were works-in-progress that would in
turn be challenged, revised, and enlarged. In her speech, “Will Women
Judges Really Make a Difference?”, Justice Wilson commented that “…
there is no reason why the judiciary cannot exercise some modest degree
of creativity in areas where modern insights and life’s experience have
57
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indicated that the law has gone awry”.60 In some cases, however, what she
viewed as a “modest degree of creativity” was seen by others as ushering
in major shifts in law, reflecting (depending on the observer) either a
much needed or unwarranted exercise of judicial power.61 For Justice
Wilson, however, it was not a matter of fitting into any particular political
or social agenda, but rather developing the law in a way that was humane
and principled, while attentive to glaring social and economic inequities
and systemic patterns of disadvantage.
In the Morgentaler case, for example, she cites Noreen Burrows for
her argument that the development of human rights began with a
“history of men struggling to assert their dignity and common humanity
against an overbearing state apparatus”.62 More recently, it is suggested
that women sought “to eliminate discrimination, to achieve a place for
women in a man’s world, to develop a set of legislative reforms in order
to place women in the same position as men”.63 What is still emerging,
according to Justice Wilson, is the process of defining “the rights of
women in relation to their special place in the societal structure and in
relation to the biological distinction between the two sexes”.64 She
endorses therefore a dynamic vision of legal and human rights:
... Thus, women’s needs and aspirations are only now being translated
into protected rights. The right to reproduce or not to reproduce which
is in issue in this case is one such right and is properly perceived as an
integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and
worth as a human being.65

In Morgentaler, Justice Wilson’s willingness to interpret constitutional
liberty as encompassing a woman’s right to make fundamental choices
about when and whether to have children constituted a landmark
innovation in Canadian law.
Another particularly interesting example is Justice Wilson’s idea that
the content and meaning of a constitutional minority language right
60
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could grow over time as society changes. Usually, judges emphasize the
universal and timeless quality of fundamental rights and freedoms. In
Assn. of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand Falls District 50
Branch v. Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc.,66 a case
involving minority language rights in New Brunswick, Justice Wilson
endorses the underlying principle of equality between French and
English.67 Drawing on the textual significance of the obligation to
advance the equality of both official languages, she articulated a
“principle of growth or development” in the constitutional minority
language rights.68 The question judges should ask, according to Justice
Wilson, “will always be — where are we currently on the road to
bilingualism and is the impugned conduct in keeping with that stage of
development?”69 Provided the government was acting in the “spirit of
equality”, its actions could be judged constitutional even if they fell
short of securing absolute equality. As Justice Wilson maintained,
constitutional protections were not to be “perceived as static”.70 Rather,
judges should interpret protections for linguistic duality in a way that
was sensitive to “an escalating standard commensurate with the
evolution of social expectations”.71 Justice Wilson was at ease with a
fluid understanding of constitutional principles; yet, her principle of
growth was not in sync with the views of the majority of the Court. Nor
did it attract support from Chief Justice Dickson, who penned a separate
dissenting judgment in the case. It stands, nonetheless, as a testament to
her creativity in judicial interpretation and to her belief in open
acknowledgement of the dynamic nature of legal concepts, and the
importance of their continued evolution in light of social change.
Justice Wilson’s dynamic understanding of the law and the
importance of its continued evolution was not limited to the domain of
constitutional and public law. An important example of her willingness
to interpret the common law principles of tort law in an innovative and
creative way is her decision as a judge at the Ontario Court of Appeal in
66
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Bhadauria v. Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology.72 The case
involved allegations of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin by an
East Indian woman seeking employment as a teacher at Seneca College.
Rather than filing a human rights complaint under the Ontario Human
Rights Code, she initiated a court action, seeking damages for
discrimination, including economic loss and “mental distress, frustration
and loss of dignity and self-esteem”.73 In concluding that there was an
independent tort of discrimination at common law, Justice Wilson traced
the evolving jurisprudence on the intersection between freedom of
contract, property rights, public policy and discrimination. She found the
decision in Re Drummond Wren to be very persuasive because the Court
based its decision to strike down a discriminatory restrictive covenant on
the grounds of public policy.74 As Justice MacKay affirmed in Re
Drummond Wren, citing Halsburys, “what is public policy ‘varies from
time to time’: the principles remain the same but they may be applied in
novel ways”.75 Justice Wilson further quoted from Prosser’s classic
Handbook on the Law of Torts, where he affirms that the “law of torts is
anything but static, and the limits of development are never set”.76 For
Justice Wilson, the novelty of a legal claim does not preclude its
recognition. With these principles in mind, Justice Wilson turns to the
preamble to the Ontario Human Rights Code77 and gleans from it
evidence of prevailing public policy regarding the fundamental
importance of equality and non-discrimination. She then relies on this
endorsement of equality to ground recognition of a common law tort of
discrimination. While it is true that there is widespread acknowledgment
of the dynamic nature of the common law, Justice Wilson demonstrated
a greater willingness than many judges to read new rights and
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obligations into the common law — insisting that it respond to changing
social realities.

V. CONCLUSION
If women lawyers and women judges through their differing
perspectives on life can bring a new humanity to bear on the decisionmaking process, perhaps they will make a difference. Perhaps they will
succeed in infusing the law with an understanding of what it means to
be fully human.78

Justice Wilson may have hesitated to situate herself within the
parameters of any social movement or philosophical tradition.
Nevertheless, recognizing the ways in which her approach to judging
incorporated critical components of both feminism and pragmatism
provides new sources of insight into her judicial contributions. Drawing
on the attentiveness to context and constrained social realities in
pragmatist philosophy and the commitments to equality at the heart of
feminist theory provides us with a broader theoretical foundation for
comprehending the logic of her decision-making. Her judgments reveal
the willingness to make tangible and immediate decisions while
acknowledging that ideal outcomes are often impossible in the face of
non-ideal conditions and constraints. This awareness of the imperfect
choices at the heart of judging prompted her to insist that we be vigilant
in continuing to question, to reconsider, to seek to develop the law to
create and recreate moments of justice in a constantly changing world.
She insisted, moreover, in informing law with a contextual appreciation
of social and economic realities. We may not agree with the decisions
she made in every case; we may think that she was mistaken or
misunderstood the litigants’ lives or needs in some cases. Still Justice
Wilson had the courage to act, to decide, and to articulate her dynamic
and contextual vision of law.
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